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Keynote Address 
Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a 
Bekins Extrapolation Too Far* 
HON. THOMAS B. BENNETT** 
 
Today, consent is a topic of much debate in the bankruptcy realm, as 
is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s recent and upcoming considerations 
of the ability of private parties to consent to a bankruptcy judge’s 
adjudication of matters that without consent, may necessitate determination 
by a federal judge having lifetime tenure.  Though some of what is to be 
presented has application to this context, it is not the subject for 
consideration here.  Rather, it is the scope, blips, and blemishes that swirl 
around one sovereign’s consent to jurisdiction over a part of it, a 
subdivision of a state, by another sovereign, the United States.  More 
precisely, it is whether the perceived scope of consent to a federal court’s 
bankruptcy jurisdiction over a state’s municipal subdivision is correct.  A 
number of reported decisions of bankruptcy courts, and even more legal 
articles, espouse the idea that once a state authorizes—that is, consents—to 
the filing of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case by one of its municipalities, 
neither the state, the municipality, nor anyone else may reject the use of 
any parts of Chapter 9 along the road to readjustment of debts. 
To view the scope of consent, a structural framework must be 
recalled.  It is the relationship of the states to the United States under the 
Constitution, which is often referred to as federalism, and involves the 
interplay of how dual sovereigns have allocated, reserved, and, yes, ceded, 
powers.  Remember that neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights 
came first.  Rather, it was the Articles of Confederation, which vested very 
little power in what we view now as the Executive Branch of our 
government.  Instead, Congress held the most power under a structure that 
retained in the hands of the thirteen colonies many of the critical powers 
necessary for an effective central government. 
 
* This is a lightly footnoted adaptation of the Keynote Address that was delivered on 
October 17, 2014, for the Campbell Law Review’s Symposium, “One City at a Time: The 
Role and Increasing Presence of Municipal Bankruptcies.” 
** Chief Bankruptcy Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama. 
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Experiencing the failings of such a structure initiated the process that 
led to enactment of the Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights.  Among 
other things, the Constitution is a ceding of powers held by the state 
sovereigns to a central government.  Some are absolutely given up, and 
others are given up only upon the federal government’s exercise of powers 
granted to it by the various states through the Constitution.  One that is 
given up only on the United States’ exercise of its constitutional grant is 
that for the provision of uniform laws on bankruptcy. 
What was a serious afterthought to the Constitution is the Bill of 
Rights, and for our purposes, the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the 
states or to the people, the “powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states.1 It is the evolving, 
dynamic interplay of what is reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment with that which is ceded or allocated to the central 
government, along with what is denied to the states under the Constitution 
that is the structure that must be dissected to have some idea of what may 
be the boundary of consent of a state to one of its parts being subjected to 
the federal government’s exercise of its Bankruptcy Clause powers. 
The structure is the Constitution, but to understand how broad or 
limited the impact of a state’s consent to the filing of a municipal 
bankruptcy is, the details of the framing need consideration.  These details 
include: (1) the Supreme Court’s rationale for striking down the 1934 
municipal bankruptcy law,2 along with its reasoning for upholding the 1937 
Act;3 (2) the structure of the first, second, and current municipal 
bankruptcy laws—the 1934 enactment,4 the 1937 statute,5 and today’s 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code;6 (3) the Tenth Amendment;7 (4) the 
Contract Clause8 and its prohibition on state impairment of contracts; (5) 
the Bankruptcy Clause, the Taxation Clause, and the Commerce Clause, all 
of which are contained in Article 1, Section Eight, of the Constitution;9 and 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 2. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) 
(invalidating the 1934 Act). 
 3. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (upholding the 1937 Act). 
 4. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton, 
298 U.S. 513. 
 5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 401–404, amended by Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 
Stat. 315 (current version codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 8. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 9. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 1 (Taxation Clause), 3 (Commerce Clause), 4 (Bankruptcy 
Clause). 
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(6) the shifting dichotomy regarding the ability of the United States to 
exercise the powers accorded to it, and the limits on its exercise of those 
powers on states as revealed—some may say muddled—by Supreme Court 
decisions. 
What will not be considered other than briefly is the issue of 
immunity, including sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment.  
This is because the view regarding consent considered here has developed 
through case law that did not rely on immunity in its various forms or on 
the Eleventh Amendment.  This case authority was premised solely on the 
interaction of the Tenth Amendment with the Bankruptcy Clause powers 
accorded to the United States. 
Although not the focus of the analysis presented, there will be a 
discussion of immunity, including sovereign immunity, and to the extent 
used in cases to be mentioned on this topic, the Eleventh Amendment.  
However, this portion of the presentation deals with what are further 
complexities in determining the environs of consent of a state to imposition 
of federal power on it or a subdivision. 
These are the framing materials with which one must work.  It is by 
consideration of these that one learns of the blips and blemishes of and to 
consent.  As the review and analysis progresses, all that I request is that any 
preconceived views on what is the perimeter of consent be set to one side. 
I. CONSENT: THE ASHTON VIEW AND ITS BEKINS REVISITATION 
A. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 110 
Perhaps the easiest entry into this consent discussion is to outline the 
abrupt shift in the position of the Supreme Court from that used to reject 
the first municipal bankruptcy law.  This shift occurred within a span of 
just under two years, from May 1936 to April 1938. 
The rejection of consent as a basis on which the federal government 
could exercise its Bankruptcy Clause powers to enable subdivisions of a 
state to file a case under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 occurred in Ashton v. 
Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1.11  The statute under 
consideration was the 1934 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, which 
added the first municipal bankruptcy law.  The Supreme Court recognized 
that the law only allowed voluntary municipal bankruptcies.  The Court 
described the contents of portions of the three sections comprising the 1934 
Act, including quoting one provision that prevented impairment of or 
 
 10. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 11. Id. 
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limitation on a state’s powers to control a municipality in the exercise of its 
political or governmental powers, and another part that restrained the 
bankruptcy court’s exercise of its powers and jurisdiction over the political 
and governmental powers of the municipality, including the use and 
enjoyment of its revenues, properties, and expenditures.  Nonetheless, the 
Court determined that it “need not consider this act in detail or undertake 
definitely to classify it.”12  In other words, the analysis was not done with 
reference to specific provisions of the 1934 Act. 
Rather, the Court in Ashton focused on the dual sovereignty of our 
federal structure.  It analogized the Supreme Court’s taxation case law 
holdings that the federal government could not tax certain aspects of a 
state’s exercise of its retained sovereign powers as being the same sort of 
prohibited conduct as the imposition of the federal bankruptcy powers on 
municipalities.  This determination overlooked and did not mention its 
contrary case law on taxation that was cited in Justice Cardozo’s dissent,13 
in which consent by one sovereign to taxation of activities of another had 
been upheld. 
Additionally, the Ashton Court looked at the 1934 Act as allowing the 
states to do what they could not do directly: impair contracts.  It read the 
1934 Act as allowing the states to indirectly impair contracts and, as a 
result, the Court viewed the Act as allowing an impermissible activity by a 
state under the Contract Clause.  With respect to consent to the exercise of 
the Bankruptcy Clause powers, the Court said that “[n]either consent nor 
submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress.”14  Thus, a 
state’s authorization for the filing of a bankruptcy case by a municipality 
did not solve what the Supreme Court then viewed as the inability of the 
federal government to expand its grant of powers under the Constitution 
over the retained sovereign rights of states by the simple expedient of 
consent.  Nor could consent be the basis under the Bankruptcy Clause to 
enable states to do indirectly what the Constitution prohibited states to do: 
impair contracts. One other point is that the Tenth Amendment 
determination made in Ashton was done without analytical consideration of 
whether the specifics of what was in the 1934 Act transgressed the 
demarcations set by the Tenth Amendment. 
 
 12. Id. at 527. 
 13. Id. at 538–39 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
 14. Id. at 531 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)). 
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/2
2015] KEYNOTE ADDRESS 7 
B. United States v. Bekins15 
Quickly after the Ashton ruling, the second municipal bankruptcy law 
was enacted,16 and it was just as swiftly attacked as unconstitutional.  By 
April of 1938, the Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins determined 
that the 1937 Act was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s Bankruptcy 
Clause powers.17  The Court looked at the contents of the four sections that 
made up this law, in conjunction with its revised view on consent by a 
state. 
In Bekins, unlike in the Ashton decision, the Supreme Court gave 
detailed attention to the contents of the statute.  One point was that only a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition could be filed.  Another was that this law 
involved compositions that the Court had determined in earlier decisions to 
be within the Bankruptcy Clause powers of Congress.  A third was 
rejection of the Ashton concept, that use of the Bankruptcy Clause powers 
enabled states to indirectly impair contracts in contravention of the 
Contract Clause.  The Bekins Court reiterated that the Contract Clause did 
not bar the United States from impairing contracts, which is what had 
occurred under the 1937 Act.  Thus, no state impairment of contracts was 
involved. 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court revised its view on consent in 
Bekins.  The Court reviewed its prior precedent regarding consent between 
two sovereigns and concluded that consent by one sovereign to the 
otherwise impermissible taking of an action by another, such as taxing or 
contracting, was not in derogation of sovereignty.  Rather, it was “the 
essence of sovereignty to be able to . . . give consents bearing upon the 
exertion of governmental power.”18  The Court also determined that the 
Tenth Amendment protected and did not destroy the right of states to give 
consent where the action consented to would not contravene the provisions 
of the Constitution.  The Bekins ruling was purely anchored in the Tenth 
Amendment without consideration of the case-law-based doctrines of 
immunity, including intergovernmental immunity, or the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
In conjunction with this revised view on consent, the Court also 
considered specific aspects of the structure of the 1937 Act.  These 
considerations included the necessity of state authorization for such a 
filing, the requirement that state law authorize all actions that are necessary 
to carry out the composition, the degree of prebankruptcy agreement by 
 
 15. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938). 
 16. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653. 
 17. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 37. 
 18. Id. at 51–52. 
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affected creditors that was mandated, along with the confirmation requisite 
of two-thirds of the aggregate amount of affected claims for approval of the 
plan, and two subsections that limited application of the Bankruptcy Clause 
powers to a state’s exercise of its political and governmental powers and 
the powers and jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court over the municipal 
debtor.  These two subsections are the forerunners of what is in §§ 903 and 
904 of the current Bankruptcy Code.19 
Based on these factors, the Bekins Court determined that the 1937 Act 
was carefully crafted to not impinge on state sovereignty, that the state 
retains control over its political, governmental, and fiscal affairs, and the 
filing of the case and approval of the plan are authorized by state law, 
approved by the bankruptcy court, and agreed upon by the municipality.20 
From this context, it viewed consent as one where the essence of 
statehood, its sovereignty, is maintained without impairment.21  Put 
differently, and in the economic climate of the late 1930s, it enabled the 
states to achieve the readjustment of debts of insolvent municipalities that 
the states could not do on their own due, in part, to the predominant view 
since Sturges v. Crowninshield22 that the Contract Clause prohibits 
impairment of contracts by states.23  It is an instance whereby granting 
consent to the intervention of the federal government’s exercise of the 
Bankruptcy Clause powers over state subdivisions, “[t]he State acts in aid, 
not in derogation, of its sovereign powers.  It invites the intervention of the 
bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State is powerless to 
rescue.”24 
Important in the upholding of the 1937 Act in Bekins was this 
revisited view on state consent.  It was one that expressly looked at the 
structure of how the 1937 Act was crafted to ensure that its structure did 
not impair what the Court perceived as the essence of sovereignty.  More 
simply put, and unlike in the Ashton decision, what was in the 1937 Act 
was critical to the determination that the consent given by the states did not 
impair their essential sovereign powers. 
Despite Ashton and Bekins being alike in the sense that both rulings 
were founded purely on the Tenth Amendment, there was a difference in 
the Court’s analytical approach.  In Bekins, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the contents of the 1937 Act to ascertain that its grasp did not extend into 
 
 19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (2012). 
 20. Id. at 37. 
 21. Id. (emphasis added). 
 22. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819). 
 23. Id. at 207. 
 24. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54. 
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the powers of states protected by the Tenth Amendment.  The analysis was 
done in two steps.  First was the determination of whether the Tenth 
Amendment barred consent by a state to what would otherwise have been 
an impermissible application of the Bankruptcy Clause powers on a state’s 
municipal subdivisions.25  Second, the Court had to confirm that the 
provisions of the 1937 Act did not exceed the limits imposed by the Tenth 
Amendment.26 
Bekins clearly stands for the constitutional ability of a state to consent 
to the United States’ exercise of its Bankruptcy Clause powers by 
expanding its bankruptcy laws to embrace a state’s municipal subdivisions, 
so long as the manner of the embrace does not impair the essential aspects 
of state sovereignty.  This is a far different and more greatly limited 
holding than is embodied in the views of many today, that consent to the 
filing of a municipal bankruptcy is tantamount to a state’s or others’ 
inability to successfully object to application of any of the provisions that 
are now in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  To fully understand this 
view requires knowing what was in the 1934 and 1937 Acts compared to 
today’s Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Code. 
II. THE COMPARISONS: CHAPTER IX OF THE 1934 ACT, CHAPTER X OF 
THE 1937 ACT, AND CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Next in the consideration of the scope of consent is outlining the 
contents of the failed 1934 Act, and then the 1937 Act, which survived 
constitutional scrutiny.  The 1934 Act27 was three sections long, and only 
one of the sections, section 80,28 contained subsections. One of the 
sections, section 78,29 dealt with the policy underlying the enactment of a 
municipal bankruptcy law.  A second, section 79,30 contained the 
jurisdictional grant for municipal bankruptcies.  The last, section 80,31 
constituted the provisions detailing the how, where, and when that a 
municipality may file for bankruptcy, have a plan of readjustment of debts 
confirmed, and exit from bankruptcy.  Moreover, section 80 delineates the 
necessity of having the plan of adjustment filed with the bankruptcy 
petition, along with a statement that, depending on the type of municipal 
 
 25. Id. at 52. 
 26. Id. at 53. 
 27. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, ch. 345, 48 Stat. 798, invalidated by Ashton v. 
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 28. Id. § 80, 48 Stat. at 798–803. 
 29. Id. § 79, 48 Stat. at 798. 
 30. Id. § 78, 48 Stat. at 798. 
 31. Id. § 80(a), 48 Stat. at 798–99. 
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entity, no less than either 30% or 51% in the aggregate amount of claims of 
certain creditors affected by the plan had approved it.32  Essentially, it is a 
filing requirement that one have a degree of pre-filing approval of the plan 
of adjustment.33  For confirmation, the requisite amount of affected claims 
by class of creditor and the requisite amount of all claims of all classes of 
creditors approving the plan was required and varied by municipal entity 
from 66 % to 75%.34 
In addition to this confirmation requirement, others that are the same 
or similar to the current provisions of § 943 of the Bankruptcy Code needed 
to be met.  However, there is one significant difference between the 
contents of Chapter IX of the 1934 Act and the current Chapter 9. 
Chapter IX was almost wholly self-contained.  By this, I mean that 
with two exceptions, no other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were 
incorporated as part of the 1934 Act.  The two exceptions were § 93(h)35 
for determining the extent of a creditor’s secured status, and § 2936 
regarding certain stays of actions.  Other than these two exceptions, the 
requirements for entry into, through, and exiting from Chapter IX were 
governed solely by the eleven subsections of section 80.37  The precursor to 
§ 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, section 80(k)38 of the 1934 Act, limited the 
ability of the municipal bankruptcy laws to “limit or impair the power of 
any State to control, by legislation or otherwise, any political subdivision 
thereof in the exercise of its political or governmental powers, including 
expenditures therefor.”39 
Similarly, the earliest version of the restrictions on the jurisdiction and 
powers of a bankruptcy court was set forth in section 80(c)(11).40  This 
subsection limited the powers of a bankruptcy judge by specifying that the 
judge “shall not, by any order or decree, in the proceeding or otherwise, 
interfere with (a) any of the political or governmental powers of the taxing 
district, or (b) any of the property or revenues of the taxing district 
necessary in the opinion of the judge for essential governmental purposes, 
or (c) any income-producing property, unless the plan of readjustment so 
provides.”41 
 
 32. Id. § 80(b), 48 Stat. at 799. 
 33. Id. § 80(c), 48 Stat. at 800. 
 34. Id. § 80(d), 48 Stat. at 801. 
 35. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), (b) (2012). 
 36. Id. § 108. 
 37. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 §§ 80(a)–(l), 48 Stat. at 798–803. 
 38. Id. § 80(k), 48 Stat. at 802. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. § 80(c)(11), 48 Stat. at 801. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Although very similar—some may say identical, in large parts—the 
1937 Act42 had slight, but subtle differences.  The second municipal 
bankruptcy law was composed of four sections.  Only one of these four 
sections, section 83,43 contained subparts.  Two of the sections, sections 
8144 and 84,45 dealt with jurisdiction. Section 81 was the grant of 
jurisdiction, and section 84 set its termination.  Section 8246 set forth four 
definitions for Chapter X, which was later redenominated as Chapter IX.  
In nine subsections, section 8347 set forth the how, when, and where the 
municipal-bankruptcy process begins and the how to get through and out of 
Chapter IX.  Its process for entry through exiting was very similar to that of 
the 1934 Act. 
One difference from both the 1934 Act and today’s Chapter 9 is that 
the 1937 Act was completely self-contained.  There were no references to 
or inclusions from other sections of the Bankruptcy Act contained within 
the 1937 Act.  In fact, the language is explicit regarding a host of matters 
from the requirements for the filing of the petition, to challenging the 
filing, to the components of the plan of composition, to confirmation, and 
to exiting from Chapter IX: all are evaluated on compliance with the 
provisions of “this chapter,” not other parts of the Bankruptcy Act outside 
of Chapter IX. 
Although the filing requirement of having the approval in writing of 
the requisite number in dollar amount of creditors affected by the plan of 
composition remained part of the municipal bankruptcy law, it is altered 
from the 1934 Act by merging what had been two categories of municipal 
debtors into one, and by having only one applicable prebankruptcy written 
approval standard: not less than 51% in dollar amount of the aggregate of 
all claims of creditors affected by the plan regardless of the type of claim.  
The confirmation requirement was also altered so that it had one 
acceptance standard for confirmation: by at least two-thirds of the 
aggregate amount of all classes of allowed claims affected by the plan the 
overwhelming majority of which was required to have been obtained 
before the filing of the municipal bankruptcy case.48  This version of 
Chapter IX was designed to be essentially a prepackaged plan. 
 
 42. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653. 
 43. Id. § 83, 50 Stat. at 655. 
 44. Id. § 81, 50 Stat. at 654. 
 45. Id. § 84, 50 Stat. at 659. 
 46. Id. § 82, 50 Stat. at 654. 
 47. Id. § 83, 50 Stat. at 655–59. 
 48. Id. § 83(a), 50 Stat. at 655. 
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The two most noteworthy alterations in the 1937 Act are those made 
to what had been in the subsections dealing with the restrictions on the 
ability of Chapter 9 to limit or impair a state’s political or governmental 
powers to control the municipal debtor, and those restrictions on the 
powers of a bankruptcy court by any order or decree founded on 
bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law to interfere with the municipal debtor’s 
political or governmental powers, its property or revenues, or its income-
producing properties.  The modification to the provision designed to retain 
the legislatively perceived proper amount of state control over the 
municipal debtor was to clarify the protection of state powers from the 
1934 Act’s section 80(k) “any political subdivision thereof”49 to being “any 
municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State”50 in section 
83(i) of the 1937 Act. 
The far more important alteration was the expansion of the limits on a 
bankruptcy court’s powers by the wording of section 83(c), which deleted 
only six words from the 1934 Act: “in the opinion of the judge,” regarding 
the inability of the bankruptcy court, absent the consent of the municipality 
in its plan, to interfere with its property or revenues “necessary for essential 
governmental purposes.”51  More simply, this deletion eliminated any 
discretion that a bankruptcy judge may have had under the statute to 
determine if a municipality’s use of properties or revenues was truly 
necessary for essential governmental purposes.  The elimination of these 
six words, along with the 1976 deletion of the phrase “necessary for 
essential governmental purposes,” have been carried forward into what is 
now in § 904 of the Bankruptcy Code.52 
The absence of provisions from both the 1934 and 1937 Acts, which 
are parts of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, is another component in the 
consideration of the scope of consent by a state to its subdivisions’ filing of 
a bankruptcy case.  From 1937 until 1976, little of Chapter IX changed 
with respect to its self-contained structure.  However, and as is often the 
case, the specter of large—in size and complexity—municipal bankruptcies 
caused a change.  The impetus for Congress to revisit how Chapter IX 
worked arose from the fear of an impending filing of bankruptcy by large 
cities and the belief that the existing simple, four-section, self-contained 
structure was unworkable for such large and complex potential filings.  
Beginning with amendments in 1976 to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy 
 
 49. Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934 § 80(k), 48 Stat. at 802. 
 50. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 83(i), 50 Stat. at 659. 
 51. Id. § 83(c), 50 Stat. at 659. 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). 
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Act,53 the self-contained structure came to an end.  Various aspects of 
powers available in corporate and individual bankruptcy cases were added 
to those powers that were utilizable by municipal debtors.  This process of 
incorporating aspects of other bankruptcy chapters into the municipal 
bankruptcy chapter continued into and after the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
Today, twenty sections are contained within Chapter 9, many of which 
have multiple subsections.  Added to these sections is incorporation into 
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code of parts of or all of fifty-four sections 
via § 901(a).54  Another twelve sections are added to Chapter 9 by § 103(f), 
which states that “[e]xcept as provided in § 901 of this title, only chapters 1 
and 9 of this title apply in a case under such Chapter 9.”55 
The subject matter of these eighty-six sections or parts of sections is 
varied and ranges from what is innocuous to those which are of 
significance when it comes to analyzing the view of the impact and scope 
of consent that many bankruptcy courts perceive it to be.  Included in this 
range of provisions are appointment of a healthcare ombudsman, immunity 
from criminal prosecution for persons required to provide information in a 
bankruptcy case, unclaimed-property distribution, the impact of dismissal 
of a case, assumption or rejection of executory contracts, reopening of a 
case, disposition of patient records, adequate protection of an interest in 
property, the automatic stay, obtaining secured credit, termination and 
retention of utility services, sections regarding creditors and their claims, 
others regulating debtor duties and benefits, yet more on the subject of 
obtaining and retaining property of a municipal debtor, and various and 
sundry sections dealing with the administration and reorganization of a 
debtor that are located in Chapter 11. 
A couple of examples point out the extrapolation too far of the Bekins 
ruling on consent.  One section that is external to, but incorporated into 
Chapter 9 that is a blip is § 301(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifies 
that the commencement of a voluntary case constitutes an order for relief 
under the chapter in which it is filed.56  However, § 921(d) specifies that if 
a Chapter 9 petition is not dismissed for failure of the municipality to 
comply with the prerequisites to filing or is not dismissed based on a bad-
faith filing, the court “shall order relief under this chapter notwithstanding 
§ 301(b).”57  Was the inclusion of § 301(b) warranted or necessary?  No.  
 
 53. See Act of Apr. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315. 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a). 
 55. Id. § 103. 
 56. Id. § 301(b). 
 57. Id. § 921(d). 
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Moreover, it has no impact on a state’s sovereignty beyond what the Bekins 
court determined to be permissible. 
At the other end of the spectrum of importance are certain sections 
brought into Chapter 9 by § 901(a).58  One is the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in § 106.59  It applies to a litany of sections within Chapter 9 and 
those brought into Chapter 9 via §§ 103(f) and 901(a).  The § 901(a) 
importing includes a waiver of sovereign immunity for thirty sections or 
parts thereof listed in § 106(a) that are brought into Chapter 9 via either 
§§ 103(f) or 901(a).  At this time, no case law has considered how 
§ 106(a)’s “[n]otwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, 
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set 
forth in this Section,”60 that is, its waiver of sovereign immunity, interacts 
with either § 903’s limit or restriction on impairment of the power of states 
to control their municipalities or § 904’s limits on the jurisdiction and 
powers of a bankruptcy court.  More importantly, no reported opinion 
addresses the Tenth Amendment’s constraints on it in the context of a 
bankrupt municipality.  This is a large blemish.  Particularly disquieting for 
the current view of consent fostered by some is that other than the Bekins 
view of consent from a Tenth Amendment prism, no issue regarding waiver 
of sovereign immunity was—indeed by Chapter IX’s self-contained nature 
could not have been—considered as part of the Supreme Court’s upholding 
of the 1937 Act. 
Equally troublesome is that the incorporation of the waiver of 
sovereign immunity by § 901(a) is reciprocated by § 106(a)’s listing of 
§ 901 as a section of the Bankruptcy Code for which its waiver of 
immunity applies.  This creates a conundrum and reveals a further blemish 
in the position espoused by those who assert that once a state consents to its 
municipality filing a Chapter 9, all of that which is in Chapter 9 has been 
consented to apply. 
Consider that § 901(a) lists fifty-four sections or parts of sections 
outside of Chapter 9 that are brought by it into Chapter 9.61  Thirty-two of 
these sections are not mentioned in § 106(a)’s listing of sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code to which its waiver of sovereign immunity applies.  Yet 
§ 106(a) specifies that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to 
§ 901(a), which is a subsection that only lists other parts of the Bankruptcy 
Code brought into Chapter 9.62  The difficulty is that the structure of these 
 
 58. Id. § 901(a). 
 59. Id. § 106(a). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 901(a). 
 62. Id. § 106(a). 
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two sections and how they may be interpreted allows one to argue that the 
waiver of § 106(a) has been expanded by how § 901 is dealt with by 
§ 106(a).  This is not a blip.  It, too, is a blemish in the currently articulated 
belief that consent to a municipal bankruptcy filing by a state is consent to 
application of all that is within Chapter 9 to either the state or its municipal 
subdivision. 
In a similar vein, another example is § 926’s allowance of the 
appointment of a trustee to exercise certain avoidance powers should a 
municipal debtor elect not to pursue them.63  Yet §§ 903 and 904 purport to 
preclude certain interferences with how a state or a municipality uses its 
expenditures, revenues, and properties.  Even if one can rationalize the 
workings of § 926 with those of §§ 903 and 904, § 926’s use of a trustee to 
obtain back expenditures, revenues, or properties from or of a state or 
municipality is of questionable value when one understands that under 
§ 904, a municipality need simply return the expenditure, revenue, or 
property to the entity from which they were recovered!  Furthermore, one 
must pay attention to the fact that §§ 903 and 904, as did their lineal 
predecessors, reflect Congress’s view on what are the aspects of state 
sovereignty that may not, absent consent, be imposed under the Bankruptcy 
Clause.  This is not necessarily the same view as that contained within the 
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment. 
Far more serious, though, is § 106(a)’s express waiver of sovereign 
immunity of a state, municipality, and other governmental units for 
purposes of § 926’s appointment of a trustee to exercise the avoidance 
powers that the municipal debtor determines not to exercise.  The interplay 
of §§ 903 and 904, and more significantly, the Tenth Amendment, are 
simply ignored by the statute as drafted.  Does this waiver trump either or 
both of the provisions of § 903 or § 904?  Even if it does, it cannot 
overcome the Tenth Amendment, should the waiver or § 926 transgress the 
boundary set by it.  Again, a blemish exists in the position taken by some 
that the consent to file under Chapter 9 means that a state or its 
municipality has consented to all that is within Chapter 9. 
These are but a few examples of sections within Chapter 9 and 
brought into Chapter 9 via §§ 103(f) and 901(a) that were never part of 
either the 1934 or 1937 Acts, and that impact in various ways a state’s 
sovereignty beyond those that were reviewed by the Supreme Court in 
Bekins.  Others exist.  The impact of the fact that none of these were, nor 
could they have been, considered by the Supreme Court in Bekins has never 
been addressed in any reported decision that indicates that a state’s consent 
 
 63. Id. § 926. 
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to bankruptcy jurisdiction for its subdivisions equates to consent by either 
the state or its subdivision to application of all that is today’s Chapter 9. 
The scope of consent considered by the Supreme Court when it struck 
down the 1934 Act and upheld the 1937 Act was done in the context of 
statutes that did not have a part of the municipal bankruptcy law’s 
numerous sections currently encapsulated into Chapter 9.  The consent 
discussions by the Court in both Ashton and Bekins were done in the 
context of far less of a statutory reach than what exists in Chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  This is one more major distinction that is not considered 
by the current view of consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction equating to the 
waiver of challenges to using all parts of the Bankruptcy Code in or 
brought into Chapter 9. 
III. THE MISSION INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT PROGENY 
Further demonstrating that this aspect of the analytical framework of 
Bekins has been overlooked is revealed by deciphering the cases upon 
which rests the theorem that consent to bankruptcy by a state for its 
municipality is consent to all that is within the current version of Chapter 9.  
The source of this view of consent is sometimes disclosed as a 1940 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
Mission Independent School District v. Texas.64  What followed in 1989 
was In re Sanitary & Improvement District, No. 7,65 some forty-nine years 
and a significantly different law later.  Then in 1992 came In re City of 
Columbia Falls, Special Improvement District No. 25,66 followed by In re 
County of Orange in two opinions, one in 199567 and the other in 1996,68 In 
re City of Vallejo69 (2009), In re Jefferson County70 (2012), In re City of 
Stockton71 (2012), and In re City of Detroit72 (2013).  Each of the courts in 
Vallejo, Stockton, Detroit, and yes, that judge in Jefferson County, 
effectively adopted what had been pronounced by the courts from In re 
Sanitary & Improvement District No. 7 and thereafter: that authorization to 
 
 64. Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1940). 
 65. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). 
 66. In re City of Columbia Falls, Special Improvement Dist. No. 25, 143 B.R. 750 
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1992). 
 67. In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 68. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 69. In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 432 B.R. 262 
(E.D. Cal. 2010). 
 70. In re Jefferson Cnty., 474 B.R. 228 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012). 
 71. In re City of Stockton, 475 B.R. 720 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012). 
 72. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
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file a municipal bankruptcy is consent to all of what is in today’s Chapter 
9.73 
Scrutiny of Mission Independent School District reveals several 
factors not considered in these courts’ rulings espousing their views on the 
scope of consent.  One is that Mission was decided in the context of the 
same four self-contained sections that Bekins considered.  Another is that 
Mission dealt with the issue of whether a Texas statute authorizing the 
filing of a municipal bankruptcy could also set the priority of payment of 
certain creditors ahead of others in disregard of what the Bankruptcy Act 
set as the priorities in Chapter IX.  Third, the provisions for confirmation in 
section 83(e) of the Bankruptcy Act set the confirmation requirements to 
include “fair, equitable, and for the best interests of the creditors and does 
not discriminate unfairly in favor of any creditor or class of creditors.”74  
Fourth, section 83(b) of the 1937 Act mandated “[t]hat the holders of all 
claims, regardless of the manner in which they are evidenced, which are 
payable without preference out of funds derived from the same source or 
sources shall be one class.”75  Lastly, most of the discussion in Mission 
entailed the invalidity of the Texas authorizing statute under Texas’s state 
constitution, which raises the specter that the bankruptcy law discussion 
may be viewed as dicta. 
For this discussion, the most important aspect is that Mission was 
decided within the ambit of the limited provision then in Chapter IX, not 
the myriad of those that have been incorporated into today’s law via 
§§ 901(a) and 103(f).  All that was addressed involved the classification 
and confirmation criteria of the version of Chapter IX that the Bekins Court 
had reviewed, not the numerous and sundry provisions that are in today’s 
law that were not before the Mission Court. 
Added to these is the basis on how the current view of consent was 
arrived at and articulated in Sanitary & Improvement District, City of 
Columbia Falls, County of Orange, City of Vallejo, City of Stockton, and 
City of Detroit, in reliance on Mission.  In their analysis of the contested 
provisions, these courts did not mention, let alone use, the Bekins standard 
for consent in the Tenth Amendment context, which is that the statutory 
provision(s) under review may not impair a state’s sovereign powers.  
Rather, each of these cases use wording with identical import.  It is that 
states which have authorized a municipal entity to file Chapter 9 which 
have, as part of the authorization or other law, language that, in practical 
 
 73. In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 975–76 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1989). 
 74. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, § 83(e), 50 Stat. 653, 658. 
 75. Id. § 83(b), 50 Stat. at 657 (emphasis added). 
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effect, prevents a municipal debtor from adjusting debt is contrary to 
Congress’s intent for adopting the laws regulating municipal bankruptcies.  
As the court stated more simply in County of Orange, a state “must accept 
[C]hapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it likes while 
disregarding the rest.”76  All of this is another reason for why the current 
position held by many on consent that purportedly flows from Bekins is too 
far of an extrapolation.  This is especially poignant when one knows that it 
occurred in cases that did not entail full consideration of the factors 
involved in making such an extrapolation. 
IV. THREE FURTHER COMPLEXITIES: CASE LAW, IMPAIRMENT, AND 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Although already complex, there are three areas of law that need 
mentioning, each of which, standing alone, presents ambiguities.  When 
added to the municipal bankruptcy scope of consent envisioned by the 
Bekins Court, these ambiguities highlight perplexing and troublesome 
issues that are left unresolved under existing Supreme Court precedent. 
One issue is how to determine the type of state activity or function 
that is shielded by the Tenth Amendment from the exercise of powers 
granted to the United States by the states under the Constitution.  Prior to 
New York v. United States,77 a simple rule was used to differentiate 
between state activities or functions upon which the United States could 
exercise its various constitutional grants of powers and those with respect 
to which it could not.  They could not be exercised with respect to 
governmental activities, but could be imposed on the proprietary or 
business activities of a state.  This standard was abandoned in New York as 
being unworkable in the evolving world that saw states undertaking as their 
functions activities that previously had only been done by the private 
sector.  What was tried next was use of a standard looking to the usual 
traditional and essential governmental functions to differentiate those state 
actions on which the United States could impose its constitutionally 
founded powers on state functions and activities. 
This criterion proved equally unavailing when it came to 
differentiating which state functions and actions were subject to the 
application of federal law.  Next was National League of Cities v. Usery,78 
which was a basis for an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act and which used 
 
 76. In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 77. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 78. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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the differentiating standard of areas of traditional governmental function 
such as fire and police protection, sanitation and public health, and parks 
and recreation.  This measuring criterion was thrown out in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.79 
Somewhat of a quandary is that the Garcia Court rejected the 
adoption of a specific rule of state immunity from federal regulation that 
turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular function or activity of a 
state is integral or traditional because it prevents a court from 
accommodating changes in the historical functions of states which have 
resulted in a number of formerly private functions, such as education, being 
assumed by the states or their subdivisions.  The Garcia Court’s refusal to 
adopt a specific standard for when federal power may be imposed on state 
functions and activities leaves us with no definitive, articulated factors 
upon which one may flesh out whether any of the sections of Chapter 9 in 
the Bekins consent formulation impair a state’s sovereignty beyond what 
Bekins determined was acceptable. 
New York v. United States involved the Taxation Clause, and National 
League of Cities and Garcia revolved around the Commerce Clause.  
Bekins involved the Bankruptcy Clause.  Each of these cases involved 
clauses in Article I, Section Eight, of the United States Constitution.80  
Each of these cases also involved considerations of sovereignty and the 
imposition of federal power on actions by a state.  For these reasons, New 
York, National League of Cities, and Garcia may assist, to a limited degree, 
in fleshing out whether and what provisions of Chapter 9 under the Bekins 
consent view either impair or do not impair the sovereign powers of a state. 
At the same time, New York, National League of Cities, and Garcia 
create a problem.  Embedded in the Court’s analysis in these three cases is 
the case-law-developed concept of intergovernmental immunity, which, as 
will be mentioned, involves sovereignty, but is different from sovereignty.  
These are major complexities that remain unresolved. 
Added to this complexity is the Supreme Court’s holding in Central 
Virginia Community College v. Katz.81  In Central Virginia Community 
College, the Supreme Court dealt with not just the waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the context of a proceeding to recover a preferential transfer 
from a college that was viewed as a subpart of the State of Virginia.82  
Despite the extensive discussion of immunity—particularly sovereign 
immunity—the Court did not rest its decision on a waiver of sovereign 
 
 79. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 81. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 360. 
17
Bennett: Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins Extrapolation
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
20 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
immunity.  Rather, the Court focused on whether Congress could subject 
states to certain bankruptcy proceedings under the Bankruptcy Clause 
granted power to enact “Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies,” which 
involved a private person or entity as the debtor.83  It was based on the 
Bankruptcy Clause powers superseding sovereign immunity. 
Thus, it was not a decision on the full scope of sovereignty, which 
needs to be distinguished from sovereign immunity and that of the Tenth 
Amendment.  Likewise, it was not a case dealing with the scope of consent 
of a state to its subdivision filing a Chapter 9 case.  That is, a case where 
the debtor is a subdivision of the state.  Just how broad the Bankruptcy 
Clause powers of Congress are regarding the implications of a state’s 
consent to the filing of a Chapter 9 as perceived by the Bekins court is not 
resolved by Central Virginia Community College.  In its most basic sense, 
Central Virginia Community College is the Bankruptcy Clause’s 
overpowering of sovereign immunity, not sovereignty and its Tenth 
Amendment shield. 
The second complication involves revisiting just what is impairment 
of a contract by a state under the Contract Clause.  There are at least three 
categories for what is such an impairment. 
I classify the first as the “absolutist view.”  It is the predominant view 
under case law, particularly that involving bankruptcies.  Under this view, 
any change in the amount to be paid back or altering of the other rights 
under a contract, regardless of the time value of what is to be received, is 
an impairment. 
The second is one that I call the “economic view.”  It is that leaving 
all other factors unaltered, such as items like the collateral security, what is 
the appropriate consideration is the present value of what is to be received 
under the contract terms versus the present value of what is to be received 
under the modified terms.  If the value to be received under the modified 
terms equals or exceeds that under the contract terms, there is no 
impairment.  If it does not, then there is impairment.  The economic view is 
part of the justification for why an extension of a contract is not a 
composition and, as a result, does not result in the impairment of a contract.  
However, some courts have begun to recognize that the extension case law 
has only looked at part of the economic equation by focusing only on 
continued payments at altered interest rates for a short term.  As pointed 
out in Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York,84 a long-enough delay in repayment 
and/or a sufficient decrease in the interest rate will eventually become 
enough of an alteration to impair a contract in the constitutional sense. 
 
 83. Id. at 359. 
 84. Ropico, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
18
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss1/2
2015] KEYNOTE ADDRESS 21 
The third conceptualization of impairment is the view espoused by 
Justice Frankfurter in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park.85  
This view may be referred to as the “realist view.”  Essentially, this view 
considers receipt of less than the face value of the payment provided for 
under a contract as not constituting an impermissible impairment under the 
Contract Clause, so long as what is received is equal to or greater than the 
market value of the obligation at the time of the restructuring of the 
indebtedness.  Because of comments by the Supreme Court in United 
States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,86 some view Faitoute as an 
outlier that has no persuasive value.  However, it should not be so casually 
disregarded. 
Both the Ropico and Faitoute opinions have independently 
incorporated into the legal analysis something that, over time, the Supreme 
Court has done with its views on the exercise of federal power over state 
functions and activities: the process of what is a sovereign activity of a 
state is not static and should not be viewed as such.  Similarly, the 
evolution of the bankruptcy law has not been and should not be static.  
What has become more important over time is not artificial and rigid 
designations for terms like “impairment.”  What is critical is the reality of 
the situation.  Under either the economic view or Justice Frankfurter’s 
realist view, the analysis is whether what you receive is equal to or better 
than what one would receive under the terms of an unaltered obligation.  
Should either conceptualization of impairment become the accepted view 
on impairment, the entire realm of municipal debt adjustment will be 
altered.  In fact, it may obviate the need for a municipal bankruptcy in 
some cases. 
The last of the three complexities is recognition that sovereignty is not 
identical to sovereign immunity.  It is accurate that sovereign immunity 
involves sovereignty considerations.  However, it does not define the set of 
factors that constitute sovereignty.  At best, sovereign immunity is a set of 
factors that may be seen as either partially intersecting the set of 
sovereignty or as a subset of sovereignty.  It does not fully occupy the 
global set that is sovereignty.  Thus, the case law that looks at immunity of 
states from the imposition of federal laws on their activities should not be 
seen as necessarily considering factors identical to those of the Supreme 
Court in Bekins concerning sovereignty in its Tenth Amendment context.  
Some will be the same, but not all.  This becomes more significant when 
one knows that certain subdivisions of states, such as counties, cities, and 
others are generally, not necessarily always, viewed under case law as 
 
 85. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 86. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
19
Bennett: Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins Extrapolation
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
22 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:3 
lacking the sovereign characteristics with which the states of the United 
States are endowed.  This is the rest of why the Supreme Court’s and lower 
federal courts’ opinions present obstacles to evaluating the sovereignty 
factors of importance in Bekins: they often do not distinguish between 
sovereignty and immunity, including sovereign immunity, as part of their 
analysis of the ability of the federal government to impose its laws on state 
functions and activities. 
CONCLUSION 
The espousal of some that a state’s authorization of its subdivisions to 
file a municipal bankruptcy case equates to it and others not being able to 
avoid application of all sections of the Bankruptcy Code that are part of 
Chapter 9 is an overstatement of what Bekins viewed as consent by a state 
in aid of its sovereign powers.  No court opinions that recite what I call the 
“no cherry pick” rule involved much, let alone a full, consideration of the 
structure and framing of the structure of the Constitution regarding the 
perimeters of the ability of a state to consent to imposition of federal 
bankruptcy powers over its municipal subdivisions.  Nor do they discuss 
the fact that the current municipal bankruptcy law’s provisions are far 
broader in reach and impact on a state’s exercise of its sovereign powers 
than those in the 1937 Act, or recognize that its limited provisions 
contained in only four sections were directly relevant to and were an 
integral part of the Bekins ruling.  This current view of consent by many is, 
at a minimum, generalized dicta accorded far too great a significance.  It is 
most likely incorrect regarding some of what are the fringes of the 
provisions of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which were never, and 
could not have been, part of the Supreme Court’s Bekins analysis. 
A more correct and limited view of the Bekins holding regarding 
consent by a state to its subdivisions filing a municipal bankruptcy case is 
that it supports such a filing under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and it 
remains to be seen how much of what has been added to the municipal 
bankruptcy law may be objected to by a state, its municipality in 
bankruptcy, and others such as creditors and parties in interest.  The 
conclusion is that the absolute nature of the so-called “no cherry pick” rule 
is unsupported by a critical analysis of the constitutional structure 
regarding sovereignty, the Bekins holding, and the context in which Bekins 
was decided.  Accordingly, this view on consent should be relegated to the 
realm of nothingness!  Paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter, “the dictum . . . is 
one of those inaccurate generalizations that ha[s] gained momentum from 
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uncritical repetition.”87 What remains to be done by the courts is the 
fleshing out of the boundaries of consent of a state set by the Constitution, 
including its applicable amendments, done in the context of the analytical 
steps used by the Bekins Court, conjoined with consideration of the bundle 
of facts unique to each case. 
 
 87. Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 513. 
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